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WORTHY OF THEIR NAME? ADDRESSING AQUATIC NUISANCE
SPECIES WITH COMMON LAW PUBLIC NUISANCE CLAIMS
CHRISTOPHER GRUBB*
INTRODUCTION

Long before modem federal environmental laws were enacted by
Congress, common law public nuisance claims were an important means of
addressing the impacts from pollution that crossed state lines
("transboundary pollution").' More recently, the Supreme Court has held
that common law public nuisance claims are displaced by modem federal
environmental laws such as the Clean Water Act ("CWA") and Clean Air
Act ("CAA") that comprehensively regulate water and air pollution. 2
The role of common law public nuisance claims to address emerging
environmental issues that are either incompletely or inadequately regulated
is less clear. For example, public nuisance claims regarding the impacts
from aquatic nuisance species 3 may provide a valuable remedy for injured
plaintiffs. The question of whether such claims are displaced by federal law
is the focus of this article.
Part I of this Note discusses whether aquatic invasive species can be
considered a public nuisance and will trace the existing legal framework for
* The author is a 2012 J.D. candidate at Chicago-Kent College of Law and is pursuing a certificate in Environmental and Energy Law. The author would like to thank Professor A. Dan Tarlock
(Chicago-Kent College of Law), Professor Noah Hall (Wayne State University Law School), and Aaron
Midler for their guidance and suggestions in reviewing drafts of this article. The author would also like
to thank his wife, Molly M. Flanagan, for her love and support.
1. See Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907) (copper company in Tennessee enjoined from creating public nuisance in Georgia through emissions of noxious gasses) [hereinafter
"Georgia T'].
2. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 305 (1981) (Clean Water Act held to pre ernpt
nuisance claims) (hereinafter "Milwaukee If'); American Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct.
2527, 2537 (2011) ("We hold that the Clean Air Act and the EPA actions it authorizes displace any
federal common law right to seek abatement of carbon-dioxide emissions from fossil-fuel fired power
plants.") [hereinafter, "AEP"].
3. The term "aquatic nuisance species" has been defined as "a nonindigenous species that threatens the diversity or abundance of native species or the ecological stability of infested waters, or commercial, agricultural, aquacultural or recreational activities dependent on such waters." 16 U.S.C.
§4702(a) (2006). The term "invasive species" has been defined as "alien species whose introduction
does or is likely to cause economic or environmental harm or harm to human health." Exec. Order No.
13,112, 64 Fed. Reg. 6183 (Feb. 3, 1999). This paper will use these terms interchangeably.
237
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addressing aquatic invasive species. Part II summarizes developments in
common law public nuisance cases involving interstate water and air pollution and the Supreme Court's displacement jurisprudence. Part II also suggests that such common law public nuisance claims will be displaced where
Congress has enacted a comprehensive scheme to regulate the pollution at
issue. Part III argues that displacement should not be applied to a currently
pending interstate common law public nuisance case involving Asian carp.
Part IV concludes by arguing that interstate common law public nuisance
claims involving aquatic invasive species should generally be available to
plaintiffs because Congress has not enacted a comprehensive regulatory
scheme to address these species that is comparable to the Clean Water Act
and Clean Air Act.
I.

THE PROBLEM OF AQUATIC NUISANCE SPECIES IN THE
UNITED STATES

A. Aquatic Nuisance Species as a Public Nuisance
Most invasive species make their way into the United States as the result of human activity: through intentional or unintentional introductions,
or through human caused habitat modifications that enable a species to gain
a foothold in a new area. 4 There are at least 4,500 invasive species that
have established populations in the United States. 5 The Great Lakes are
home to more than 180 aquatic invasive species. 6 The National Invasive
Species Council ("NISC") 7 has described the threat associated with invasive species in this way:
Invasive species ... may prey upon, displace or otherwise harm native
species. Some invasive species also alter ecosystem processes, transport
disease, interfere with crop production, or cause disease in animals or
humans; affecting both aquatic and terrestrial habitats.
For these reasons,
8
invasive species are of national and global concem.

4. U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT,

OTA-F-565,

HARMFUL NON-

INDIGENOUS SPECIES INTHE UNITED STATES 5 (1993) [hereinafter "OTA"].
5. Id. at3.
6. NOAA

GREAT

LAKES

AQUATIC

NONINDIGENOUS

SPECIES

LIST,

http://www.glerl.noaa.gov/res/Programs/glansis/glansis.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2011) [hereinafter
"NOAA"].
7. The NISC was created by Executive Order 13112, is governed by the heads of several federal
agencies, and is "charged with providing coordination, planning and overall leadership for federal
invasive species programs and reaching out to state, tribal, local and private partners." National Invasive Species
Management
Plan
2008-2012,
at
4
(Aug.
2008),
available at
http://www.invasivespecies.gov/homedocuments/20082012%20National%20Invasive%2OSpecies%2OManagement%20Plan.pdf.
8. Id. at 7.
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In addition to causing vast ecological damage, invasive species also
exact an economic toll. One recent study put the cost of dealing with invasive species at $120 billion annually, or about $1100 per household. 9 Zebra
mussels, which have a tendency to clog the water intake pipes of power
plants around the Great Lakes, can cost each infested power plant $3 million each year.10 Invasive plant species cause at least two to three billion
dollars in annual crop damage in the United States.I Aquatic invasive species introduced to the Great Lakes by shipping have been estimated to cost
the region at least $200 million annually.12
A public nuisance is "an unreasonable interference with a right common to the general public." 3 The U.S. experience with two aquatic invasive species, Asian carp1 4 and the zebra mussel, demonstrate that public
rights in navigation, bathing, and fishingI5 may be harmed by the introduction of aquatic invasive species. Asian carp have caused extensive damage
to ecosystems in the United States and currently threaten the Great Lakes.' 6
First introduced to clean aquaculture facilities in the southern United
States, in the 1980s Asian carp escaped and have advanced through the
Mississippi River, Illinois River, and have been found within miles of Lake
Michigan.17 In parts of the Illinois River, Asian carp make up over ninety

9. David M. Lodge et al., Biological Invasions: Recommendationsfor U.S. Policy and Management, 16(6) ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 2035, 2036 (2006) (citing David Pimental et al., Update on the
Environmental and Economic Costs Associated with Alien-invasive Species in the United States, 52
ECOLOGICAL ECON. 273-288 (2005)).

10. Id. (citing Brian Leung et al., An Ounce of Preventionor a Pound of Cure: Bioeconomic Risk
Analysis of Invasive Species, PROC. OF THE ROYAL SOC'Y OF LONDON SERIES B: 269 BIOLOGICAL

SCIENCES 2407-2413 (2002)).
11. NATIONAL INVASIVE SPECIES COUNCIL, supra note 7, at 4 (citing DAVID C. BRIDGES, CROP

LOSSES DUE TO WEEDS INTHE UNITED STATES (Weed Science Society of America ed., 1992)).
12. David Lodge and David Finnoff, Annual Losses to GreatLakes Region by Ship-borne Invasive
available
at
$200
Million
(July
2008),
Species
at
Least
http://www.invasivespeciesinfo.gov/economic/main.shtml.
13. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821B(1) (1979).
14. For the purposes of this article, the term "Asian carp" will include both bighead carp and
silver carp.
15. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821B cmt. g ("[T]he pollution of a stream that merely
deprives fifty or a hundred lower riparian owners of the use of the water for purposes connected with
their land does not for that reason alone become a public nuisance. If, however, the pollution prevents
the use of a public bathing beach or kills the fish in a navigable stream and so deprives all members of
the community of the right to fish, it becomes a public nuisance.").
16. See ASIAN CARP REGIONAL COORDINATING COMMITTEE, http://asiancarp.org/backgroundthreat/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2011) ("Bighead and silver carp escaped into the wild in the 1980s and have
been swimming northward ever since, overwhelming the Mississippi and Illinois River systems . .. The
Great Lakes are at serious risk from Asian carp.").
17. Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, No. 10-cv-4457, 2010 WL 5018559, *7 (N.D. Ill.
Dec. 2, 2010) [hereinafter "Michigan"].
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percent of the biomass.18 Asian carp, which can weigh up to 100 pounds,19
interfere with public rights in navigation due to their penchant for jumping
out of the water in the presence of engine noise from passing boats. The
sheer quantity of fish flying through the air is enough to make navigation
unsafe in invaded areas, and indeed some boaters have been injured after
being hit by a jumping carp. 20
In a different but equally destructive way, the zebra mussel has impacted U.S. waterways to the detriment of the public's right to fish and
bathe. Zebra mussels-small mollusks native to eastern Europe-were first
discovered in the Great Lakes in the 1980s, 2 1 and it is widely believed they
were introduced as a result of ocean-going shipping on the Great Lakes. 22
Zebra mussels have had a profoundly negative impact on the food web of
the Great Lakes and can disrupt commercial and recreational boating. 2 3 In
addition, the shells of dead zebra mussels, which can be extremely sharp,
have so extensively littered some beaches on the Great Lakes as to severely
constrain the public's right to enjoyment of the waterway. 24
The Asian carp and zebra mussel make clear that invasive species
have harmed rights common to the public. Unfortunately, Congress has had
difficulty addressing their introduction and spread through legislation.
B.

The Existing Legal Frameworkto Address Aquatic Invasive Species

The regulatory landscape relevant to the control of invasive species
has been described as a "largely uncoordinated patchwork of laws, regulations, policies, and programs," 2 5 and it has not been effective in stopping
their introduction and spread. One significant component of this "patch-

18. ASIAN CARP REGIONAL COORDINATING COMMITTEE, supra note 16 ("In some areas, the
Asian carp now comprise more than 95% of the biomass (MICRA 2002).").
19. Michigan, 2010 WL 5018559 at *3 ("Two species of Asian carp are of particular concern
here: silver carp, which can grow to lengths of three feet and weights of [sixty] pounds, and bighead
carp, which can grow to lengths of five feet and weights approaching 100 pounds.").
20. Id. ("Also, because of their large size and jumping ability, silver carp have injured boaters and
caused property damage.").
21. NOAA, supra note 6.
22. See UNITED STATES GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, ZEBRA MUSSEL (DREISSENA POLYMORPHA) FACT

SHEET, http://nas.er.usgs.gov/queries/FactSheet.aspx?specieslD=5 (last visited Feb. 26, 2011).
23. Id.
24. See ANS TASK FORCE, HARMFUL AQUATIC HITCHHIKERS: MOLLUSKS: ZEBRA MUSSEL,

http://www.protectyourwaters.net/hitchhikers/molluskszebramussel.php (last visited Feb. 26, 2011)
("Beaches are also affected by zebra mussels. The sharp-edged mussel shells along swimming beaches
can be a hazard to unprotected feet.").
25. OTA, supra note 4, at 163 (adding that, "In general, present Federal efforts only partially
match the problems at hand.").
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work" is the Lacey Act of 1900.26 The Lacey Act was adopted in an attempt to restore populations of certain bird species that were being harmed,
in part, by introductions of non-native species. 27 In its current form, the
Lacey Act authorizes the United States Fish and Wildlife Service
("USFWS") to prohibit the importation and interstate transport of a list of
species deemed "injurious to human beings, to the interests of agriculture,
horticulture, forestry, or to wildlife or the wildlife resources of the United
States ... ."28 The USFWS has made several attempts over the years to
place a blanket prohibition on the importation of all species, allowing only
those species found on a "low-risk list."29 However, substantial opposition
from the pet industry defeated such proposals. 30 Today, unless a species is
regulated by another law, or is found on the USFWS list of injurious species, importation into the U.S. is allowed. 3 1
The Lacey Act has been criticized as being ineffective in stopping the
importation and spread of invasive species in the U.S.32 The brunt of the
criticism is aimed at the Lacey Act's approach of allowing the importation
of all species except for those found to be injurious, as opposed to prohibiting the importation of all species except those found to be low-risk. 33 Additionally, the Lacey Act has been criticized for not placing enough species
on the list, for the length of time required to list a species, for only being
effective for those few species not already in the U.S. when listed, and for
failing to fund the USFWS adequately. 34 Despite being in effect for over
100 years, the Lacey Act's list of injurious species contains only seventeen
taxa that are denied importation, and critics argue that hundreds if not thousands more taxa are injurious and should be prohibited. Critics have also
noted that "[t]he listing time has generally increased from [less than one]
year in the mid-[twentieth] century to a mean of at least 4.8 years for taxa
(n = 4) that were pending listing as of March 1, 2007."35 Further, many of
the species found on the list were already present in the United States at the
26. 31 Stat. 187 (1900).
27. Andrea J. Fowler et al., Failure of the Lacey Act to Protect U.S. Ecosystems Against Animal
Invasions, 5(7) FRONTIERS IN ECOLOGY AND THE ENV'T 353, 354 (2007) (citing Robert S. Anderson,
The Lacey Act: America's Premier Weapon in the Fight Against Wildife Trafficking, 16 PUBLIC LAND
L. REv. 27 (1995)).

28. 18 U.S.C. §42(a)(1) (2009).
29. Fowler, supra note 27, at 354 (noting unsuccessful attempts by the USFWS to enact such a
policy in 1973 and 1975).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 357-359.
33. Id. at 359.
34. Id. at 357-359.
35. Id. at 357.

242

CHICAGO-KENTLAW REVIEW

[Vol 87:1

time they were listed, and the Act has done nothing to stop their spread. 36
Thus, critics have come to the conclusion that "[t]he contemporary threat of
invasive species has far outstripped current authority and practices under
[the Lacey Act]." 37
In addition to the Lacey Act, the Nonindigenous Aquatic Nuisance
Prevention and Control Act of 199038 (NANPCA) represents another attempt by Congress to address the impacts of invasive species. NANPCA
was passed in the wake of the discovery of the zebra mussel in the Great
Lakes. 39 Recognizing the risk posed by introductions of invasive species
like the zebra mussel, Congress set out to "prevent [the] unintentional introduction and dispersal of nonindigenous species into waters of the United
States through ballast water management and other requirements." 40
Congress attempted to achieve its goal in large part by directing the
Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security to issue regulations applicable to ships with ballast water tanks operating on the Great
Lakes. 4 1 Congress instructed that the regulations require such ships to: a)
conduct ballast water exchange (BWE) on waters beyond the exclusive
economic zone (EEZ), b) conduct BWE on other waters where the BWE
would not pose a threat of infestation, or c) utilize an alternative ballast
water management method if the Secretary determines that such methods
are as effective as BWE.42 In 1996, Congress passed the National Invasive
Species Act ("NISA"), which amended NANPCA, most notably by directing the Secretary to issue "voluntary guidelines" that essentially mirrored
the Great Lakes provisions but were applicable nationwide. 43
As of this writing, the Coast Guard has promulgated ballast water regulations pursuant to NANPCA as amended by NISA.44 Ships visiting ports
in the Great Lakes that "carry ballast water" must conduct BWE outside the
EEZ, retain their ballast water on board the ship, or use an accepted alternative ballast water management method. 4 5 The regulations also require ships
that are coming into U.S. waters from beyond the EEZ, and that are carry36. Id ("For the few taxa that have been prohibited entry, more than half were already present in
the US at the time of listing, and spread occurred for most established species subsequent to listing.
Thus, the listing process does not seem to have accomplished the intended goal, even for the majority of
the very few taxa that were listed.").
37. Id. at 359.
38. 16 U.S.C. §4701 et. seq. (2009).
39. USGS, supra note 22 (Zebra mussels were discovered in the Great Lakes in 1988).
40. 16 U.S.C. at §4701(b)(1).
41. Id. at § 4711(b).
42. Id. at §4711(b)(2).
43. Pub. L. 104-332, 110 Stat 4073, 4077-4079 (Oct. 26, 1996) (now codified as §4711(c)).
44. 33 C.F.R. pt. 151 subparts C, D (2010).
45. Id at § 151.1510(a).
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ing ballast water that was taken on less than 200 nautical miles from any
shore, to conduct BWE, retain the ballast water onboard the ship, or use an
alternative ballast water management method.4 6 In addition, the St. Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation, an arm of the U.S. Department of
Commerce, now requires ships entering the U.S. portion of the St. Lawrence Seaway in the "No Ballast on Board" (NOBOB) 47 condition to conduct saltwater flushing before entering the seaway. 48
However, despite the existing ballast water laws and regulations, new
aquatic invasive species have continued to make their way into the Great
Lakes. 49 At least sixteen such species have been found in the Great Lakes
since passage of NISA. 50 Recognizing the shortcomings of the existing
regulatory framework, some in Congress have unsuccessfully attempted to
pass legislation that would require ocean-going ships to install treatment
technology that would kill organisms residing in the ship's ballast water. 51
Some environmental advocates have taken a different approach to the problem by arguing that the U.S. EPA must regulate ballast water discharge as a
point source discharge under the CWA. 52
Soon after passage of the CWA, the EPA promulgated a regulation
that exempted "discharges incidental to the operation of a vessel" from
permit requirements under the Act. 53 In Northwest Environmental Advocates v. United States Environmental ProtectionAgency, the court held that
the regulation was not authorized by the CWA because the statute's plain
language prohibited such discharges. 54 In a later proceeding focused on the
appropriate remedy for EPA's ultra vires action, the court instructed the
EPA to create a replacement regulation within two years. 55 The EPA has
since issued a "Vessel General Permit." 56 The regulations include two
technology-based effluent limitations, which require BWE for ocean-going
46. Id at § 151.2035(b).
47. Such vessels, which usually contain residual amounts of water and sediment that can harbor
invasive species, have proved to be a vexing problem for regulators. See Johengen, et. al., Assessment of
Transoceanic NOBOB Vessels and Low-Salinity Ballast Water as Vectorsfor Non-Indigenous Species
Introductions
to
the
Great
Lakes
6
(Apr.
2005),
available
at
http://www.glerl.noaa.gov/res/projects/nobob/products/NOBOBFinalReport2005O4l5.pdf.
48. 33 C.F.R. §401.30(f).
49. See NOAA, supra note 6.
50. Id
51. See, e.g., National Aquatic Invasive Species Act, S. 770, 109th Cong., § 1101(b)(3) (2005).
52. See Nw. Envtl. Advocates v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 2005 WL 756614 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30,
2005).
53. 40 C.F.R. § 122.3(a).
54. 2005 WL 756614, at *13.
55. Nw. Envtl. Advocates v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 2006 WL 2669042, *10 (N.D. Cal. Sept.
18, 2006), aff'd, 537 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2008).
56. 73 Fed. Reg. 79,473 (Dec. 29, 2008).
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ships and saltwater flushing for ships in the NOBOB condition.57 The regulation also includes a water quality-based effluent limitation, which requires, "Your discharge must be controlled as necessary to meet applicable
water quality standards in the receiving waterbody or another waterbody
impacted by your discharges." 58 However, the EPA indicates that it "generally expects that compliance with the other conditions in this permit ...
will control discharges as necessary to meet applicable water quality standards." 59 Except for the loosely defined water quality-based effluent limitation, to the extent that the VGP is consistent with what is already required
by NANPCA and its associated regulations, and by the St. Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation regulations, it essentially maintains the
status quo.
In short, invasive species remain a tremendous problem in the U.S.,
harm rights shared by the public, and Congress has had little success controlling them. Many aquatic invasive species may unquestionably be considered a public nuisance. The ecological and economic impacts from
invasive species generally, as well as the specific experience with Asian
carp and the zebra mussel, make it clear that such species often cause impacts that harm rights common to the public such as navigation, bathing,
and fishing. Indeed, it is telling that one of the primary statutes to address
aquatic invasive species in the United States refers to these species as a
nuisance in its title: The Nonindigenous Aquatic Nuisance Prevention and
Control Act. 60 The remainder of this article addresses whether impacts
from invasive species can be addressed by the common law of public nuisance given the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in the field.
II. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF COMMON LAW PUBLIC NUISANCE
CLAIMS FOR TRANSBOUNDARY POLLUTION IMPACTS

A. Water Pollution
The Chicago River looms large in the history of common law public
nuisance claims over transboundary water pollution, being the epicenter of

57. See U.S. Entl. Prot. Agency, Vessel GeneralPermit for DischargesIncidental to the Normal
Operation of Vessels
(VGP),
at
2.2.3.5,
2.2.3.7
(Feb.
2009),
available at
http://www.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/vesselvgp_permit.pdf.
58. Id. at 2.3.1.
59. Id.

60. 16 U.S.C. Ch. 67 (2010).
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what is regarded as the first, 61 as well as one of the most recent, of such
claims. 62 The first such case arose after Chicago famously reversed the
flow of the Chicago River in 1900, sending its sewage toward St. Louis
instead of into Lake Michigan. 63 Missouri sued Illinois on a theory of public nuisance for alleged harms resulting from the increased sewage pollution it would have to bear 64 In its demurrer to the complaint, Illinois
argued, in part, that Missouri could not be entitled to the equitable relief it
desired because it was not clear that the sewage from Chicago would become a nuisance to the residents of Missouri. 65 Although the Court in Missouri I focused primarily on jurisdictional issues, its response to Illinois'
argument with respect to the public nuisance claim presaged its ultimate
decision to overrule the demurrer, "Can it be gravely contended that there
are no preventive remedies, by way of injunction or otherwise, against
injuries not inflicted or experienced, but which would appear to be the natural result of acts of the defendant, which he admits or avows it to be his
intention to commit?" 66 In Missouri II the Court ultimately concluded that
Missouri had failed to prove that Illinois' actions had caused an increase in
typhoid fever in St. Louis. 67
At the time of MissouriI and Missouri II, there was little in the way of
federal water pollution regulation. 68 However, by the time the State of Illinois sued the City of Milwaukee on a public nuisance theory, 69 Congress
had passed "numerous laws touching interstate waters," 70 including most
recently, amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. 7 1 However, the Court noted that "[t]he remedy sought by Illinois is not within the
precise scope of remedies prescribed by Congress." 72 Although the Court
found that the suit was not properly within its original jurisdiction, 73 it held
61. See Shell J. Bleiweiss, Environmental Regulation and the FederalCommon Law of Nuisance:
A Proposed Standard of Preemption, 4 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV., 41 & n.l (1983) (citing Missouri v.
Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1906) [hereinafter "Missouri If']).
62. Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, No. 10-cv-4457, 2010 WL 5018559 (N.D. 111.Dec. 2,
2010).
63. Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 212 (1901) [hereinafter "MissouriF'].
64. Id. at 214.
65. Id. at 242-243.
66. Id at 243.
67. 200 U.S. 496 at 526.
68. But see Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 ch. 425, § 13, 30 Stat. 1121, 1152 (current version at
33 U.S.C. § 407 (2009)).
69. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 93 (1972) (Illinois alleged Milwaukee's sewage
discharges were polluting Lake Michigan) [hereinafter "Milwaukee 1'].
70. Id. at 101.
71. Pub. L. 87-88, July 20, 1961, 75 Stat. 204.
72. Milwaukee 1, 406 U.S. at 103.
73. Id. at 101.
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that Illinois could go forward in federal district court with its common law
public nuisance suit.74 The Court reasoned that in cases of interstate air and
water pollution "there is a federal common law," 75 and that the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act as it existed in early 1972 expressly did not
displace such suits.76 After Illinois subsequently filed suit in the District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois, the district court ruled in favor of
Illinois. 77 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in
part 78, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. 79
In Milwaukee II, the Supreme Court held that the recent passage of the
Clean Water Act displaced federal common law in the field of water pollution.8 0 Initially, the Court noted that unlike state courts, federal courts are
not general common law courts empowered to create their own rules of
decision. 81 The Court described the limited circumstances in which federal
common law may be created and applied: "When Congress has not spoken
to a particular issue, however, and when there exists a 'significant conflict
between some federal policy or interest and the use of state law,' the Court
has found it necessary, in a 'few and restricted' instances, to develop federal common law." 82 In cases where "Congress has spoken," the Court explained that its commitment to the separation of powers would prevent it
from creating new federal common law.83
The Milwaukee II Court found that Congress had created an "all encompassing program of water pollution regulation" in passing the Clean
Water Act. 84 The Court found that the CWA and its associated regulations
specifically addressed the effluent limitation, sewage overflow, and combined sewer issues raised by Illinois.8 5 The Court made two other observations worth noting. First, the Court opined that because the field of water
pollution was so technically complex, its regulation was best placed in the
hands of the authorized administrative agency that possessed the necessary
74. Id. at 108.
75. Id. at 103 (citing Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1971)).
76. Id. at 104 (noting that § 10(b) of the Act expressly encouraged state and interstate action to
combat water pollution, and that such action shall not be displaced by federal enforcement action).
77. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
78. Id. at 304-305.
79. Id at 307-308.
80. Id at 317.
81. Id at 312 (citing Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)).
82. Id at 313 (citations and footnote omitted).
83. Id. at 315 (quoting TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 195 (1978)).
84. Id. at 318.
85. Id at 319-323 (The Court explained that "[a]lthough a federal court may disagree with the
regulatory approach taken by the agency with responsibility for issuing permits under the Act, such
disagreement alone is no basis for the creation of federal common law.").
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expertise, rather than in the hands of a federal common law regime where
regulation would inevitably be "sporadic" and "ad hoc." 8 6 Second, the
Court emphasized that the basis for the Milwaukee I Court's ruling-that
federal statutory law did not provide Illinois a forum in which to protect its
interests-was no longer applicable because the CWA provided Illinois
with ample opportunity to seek redress. 8 7
The question left open by Milwaukee II-whether state common-law
nuisance suits involving transboundary water pollution were displaced by
the CWA-was subsequently addressed by the Court in InternationalPaper Co. v. Oullette.8 8 In Oullette, landowners on the Vermont side of Lake
Champlain, which borders both Vermont and New York, sued a paper
company on the New York side of the lake. 89 The landowners sued under
Vermont law alleging the paper company was creating a continuing nuisance through its discharges of water pollution to the lake, allegedly harming plaintiffs' property values. 9 0 The Court held that public nuisance
lawsuits are preempted by the CWA when brought under the common law
of the state affected by the pollution, but not when brought under the law of
the state where the pollution originated. 9 ' The Court described how a ruling
that would allow common law nuisance suits under the affected state's laws
would conflict with the broad goals and purposes of the CWA:
If a New York source were liable for violations of Vermont law, that law
could effectively override both the permit requirements and the policy
choices made by the source State. The affected State's nuisance laws
would subject the point source to the threat of legal and equitable penalties if the permit standards were less stringent than those imposed by the
affected State. Such penalties would compel the source to adopt different
control standards and a different compliance schedule from those approved by the EPA, even though the affected State had not engaged in
the same weighing of the costs and benefits. . . . The inevitable result of
such suits would be that Vermont and other States could do indirectly
what they could not do directly - regulate the conduct of out-of-state
sources. 92
In contrast, the Court held that a nuisance suit brought under the
source state's law would not conflict with the CWA for two reasons. 93
First, the CWA specifically allows source states to adopt more stringent
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 325 (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 325-326.
479 U.S. 481 (1987).
Id. at 483-484.
Id
Id at 493-494.
Id. at 495.
Id at 497.
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pollution control requirements, including through state nuisance law. 94
Second, unlike the "indeterminate number of potential regulations" emanating from suits in a regime allowing suits under affected-states' nuisance
law, lawsuits based on source-state law would not conflict with the CWA's
goals of efficiency and predictability because a pollution source would
need only to comply with the pollution control requirements of the CWA
and the source state's common law. 95
B. Air Pollution
One year following Missouri I, the Court heard a common law public
nuisance case involving transboundary air pollution. 96 In Georgia I, the
State of Georgia sued two copper companies located in Tennessee seeking
an injunction to prevent the companies from discharging sulfuric acid gas
that was causing harm to the forests, orchards, and crops in parts of Georgia. 97 Writing for the Court, Justice Holmes noted that although the case
had been argued as if it were a case between two private parties, if it really
were such a case Georgia would lose because it owned very little of the
property being damaged. 9 8 However, the Court recognized that Georgia, as
a quasi-sovereign, "has an interest independent of and behind the titles of
its citizens, in all the earth and air within its domain." 99 The Court explained,
It is a fair and reasonable demand on the part of a sovereign that the air
over its territory should not be polluted on a great scale by sulphurous
acid gas, that the forests on its mountains .. . should not be further destroyed or threatened by the act of persons beyond its control, that the
crops and orchards on its hills should not be endangered from the same
source. 100

The Court held that Georgia had proven its case under the requirements of Missouri I,101 gave the copper companies a reasonable time to
abate the nuisance, and invited Georgia to return if the copper companies'
efforts failed to stop the noxious gasses.1 02
Prior to the Supreme Court's recent decision in AEP, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit came close to ruling that the Clean Air Act
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 497-499.
1d. at 499.
Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907).
Id. at 236.
Id. at 237.

99. Id.
100. Id. at 238.

101. Id. at 238-239.
102. Id. at 239.

2012]

ADDRESSING AQUATIC NUISANCE CLAIMS

249

displaced common law public nuisance claims involving air pollution.10 3 In
TVA, the State of North Carolina sued the Tennessee Valley Authority alleging that the impacts on North Carolina residents from emissions of air
pollution at TVA's coal-fired power plants in Alabama and Tennessee constituted a public nuisance. 104 A federal district court enjoined TVA from
continuing the public nuisance and ordered it to install costly emissions
control equipment at its coal-fired power plants. 0 5 On appeal, the Fourth
Circuit reversed the district court, holding that "[i]t is not open to this court
to ignore the words of the Supreme Court, overturn the judgment of Congress, supplant the conclusions of agencies, and upset the reliance interests
of source states and permit holders in favor of the nebulous rules of public
nuisance."l 0 6
The court identified several reasons for its holding. First, like the
Court's analysis of the CWA in Milwaukee 11, the TVA court similarly
found that the CAA represented a comprehensive regulatory scheme for air
pollution. 0 7 The court read Oullette as strongly cautioning against allowing such common law public nuisance suits in a field so extensively regulated. 0 8 Second, the court found that the district court had violated Oullette
by improperly applying affected-state law instead of source-state law.109
Third, the court said that even if it were found that the district court had
properly applied source-state law, the fact that the TVA's power plants
were in compliance with CAA permits suggested there was no public nuisance.11 0 The court summarized its position, writing,
No matter how lofty the goal, we are unwilling to sanction the
least predictable and the most problematic method for resolving
interstate emissions disputes, a method which would chaotically
upend an entire body of clean air law and could all too easily redound to the detriment of the environment itself. 1 1
103. North Carolina v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 615 F.3d 291, 302 (4th Cir. 2010) ("We need
not hold flatly that Congress has entirely preempted the field of emissions regulation.").
104. Id. at 297.
105. Id. at 298.
106. Id. at 306.
107. See id. at 298-301 (describing the CAA at length to demonstrate its comprehensive approach
to regulating air pollution).
108. Id at 303 ("We can state, however, with assurance that Ouellette recognized the considerable
potential mischief in those nuisance actions seeking to establish emissions standards different from
federal and state regulatory law and created the strongest cautionary presumption against them.").
109. Id. at 309 ("[The district court's] decision was tied so tightly to the North Carolina Clean
Smokestacks Act that it violates Ouellette's directive that source state law applies to interstate nuisance
suits.").
110. Id. at 309-310 (noting that both Alabama and Tennessee nuisance laws say there is no abatable nuisance where an activity is expressly licensed or authorized by law).
Il l. Id. at 312.
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Most recently, in AEP, the Supreme Court held that the CAA displaced federal common law public nuisance claims seeking abatement of
carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel fired power plants.11 2 In AEP,
eight states and New York City, along with a group of three nonprofit land
trusts, sued four private companies and the Tennessee Valley Authority
under the federal common law of public nuisance and alternatively under
state tort law.11 3 The plaintiff-respondents alleged that the carbon dioxide
emissions associated with the defendant-petitioners' power plants contributed to global warming, thereby causing an unreasonable interference with
public rights.11 4 All plaintiffs sought injunctive relief requiring caps on the
carbon emissions of the defendant-petitioners' power plants. 15
Beginning with the oft-quoted premise that "[t]here is no federal general common law," the Court nonetheless acknowledged that a number of
decisions of the Court both pre- and post-Erie "have approved federal
common law suits brought by one State to abate pollution emanating from
another State."ll 6 However, the Court cautioned that it had not yet decided
whether private citizens or political subdivisions of a State could maintain a
federal common law nuisance action to abate out-of-state pollution, and
that it had never held that a State may sue "to abate any and all manner of
pollution originating outside its borders."" 7
Turning to the displacement question, the Court had little problem
finding that the CAA displaced federal common law, particularly in the
wake of Massachusetts v. EPA.11 8 According to the Court, the test for
whether federal legislation displaces a federal common law cause of action
"is simply whether the statute 'speak[s] directly to [the] question' at issue." 1l9 The Court rejected the position of plaintiffs and the Second Circuit
that federal common law public nuisance claims to abate carbon dioxide
emissions are not displaced by the CAA until the EPA exercises its regula112. American Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2537 (2011).
113. Id at 2533-2534. Because the Second Circuit did not reach the question, and none of the
parties briefed the issue, the court left open for consideration on remand the issue of whether plaintiffs
could proceed under state nuisance law. Id. at 2540.
114. Id. at 2534.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 2535-2536 (citing Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901), New Jersey v. City of New
York, 283 U.S. 473, 477, 481-483 (1931), and Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 240 U.S. 650 (1916)
as examples of pre-Erie cases, and Milwaukee I as an example of a post-Erie case).
117. Id. at 2536.
118. See id. at 2537 ("Massachusetts made plain that emissions of carbon dioxide qualify as air
pollution subject to regulation under the Act. And we think it equally plain that the Act 'speaks directly'
to emissions of carbon dioxide from defendants' plants." (internal citations omitted)).
119. Id. (quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 625 (1978); citing City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981) and County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 470
U.S. 226, 236-237 (1985)).
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tory authority by setting standards governing such emissions from power
plants. 120 The Court wrote that
[t]he critical point is that Congress delegated to EPA the decision
whether and how to regulate carbon-dioxide emissions from power plants; the delegation is what displaces federal common law.
Indeed, were EPA to decline to regulate carbon-dioxide emissions
altogether at the conclusion of its ongoing §7411 rulemaking, the
federal courts would have no warrant to employ the federal common law of nuisance to upset the agency's expert determination. 12 1
Finally, echoing TVA, the Court found that the CAA's reliance on the
EPA as an expert agency also supported the Court's displacement holding.1 22
C.

When is DisplacementAppropriate?

From the foregoing cases, the following rules govern displacement of
common law public nuisance claims for impacts from transboundary pollution: Federal common law claims are displaced where 1) Congress has
enacted a comprehensive scheme to regulate the pollution at issue, or 2)
there would otherwise be a forum available for the remedy sought. In cases
where Congress has acted and the nuisance claim is brought under state tort
law, the claim must be brought under the laws of the state which is the
source of the pollution and a ruling in favor the plaintiff must not conflict
with the enacted regulatory scheme.
Federal legislation will preempt state law only where there is "evidence of a clear and manifest purpose" to do so. 123 However, because federalism concerns do not come into play when the question is whether an act
of Congress displaces federal common law, such displacement will be more
readily found.124 The simple act of Congress passing laws in a given field,
however, does not lead to the conclusion that those laws preempt federal
common law.125 For example, the precursor to the CWA at issue in Mil-

120. Id. at 2538.
121. Id. at 2538-2539 (the court added that the EPA's judgment in the rulemaking would "not
escape" judicial review).
122. Id. at 2539-2540 (noting that "[flederal judges lack the scientific, economic, and technological
resources an agency can utilize in coping with issues of this order," and that "federal district judges ...
lack authority to render precedential decisions binding other judges, even members of the same court.").
123. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 316-317 (1981).
124. Id. at 317 ("Indeed ... we start with the assumption that it is for Congress, not federal courts,
to articulate the appropriate standards to be applied as a matter of federal law.") (internal quotation and
footnote omitted).
125. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 108 n.9 (1972) (quoting Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d
236, 241-242 (10th Cir. 1971) ("Until the field has been made the subject of comprehensive legislation
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waukee I was found not to preempt federal common law because the remedy sought by Illinois was not within the scope of remedies provided by
Congress at that time, and the statute had explicitly provided that "interstate action to abate [transboundary water pollution] ... shall not be displaced." 26 Thus, a federal statute should not be held to occupy a given
field if it represents less than a comprehensive attempt to regulate in a given field, and/or includes a "savings clause" for federal common law causes
of action.
III.

COMMON LAW PUBLIC NUISANCE CLAIMS SHOULD BE
AVAILABLE TO REMEDY IMPACTS FROM AQUATIC INVASIVE

SPECIES
Generally speaking, common law public nuisance claims for impacts
from aquatic invasive species should not be considered to be displaced by
federal law. Aquatic invasive species such as the zebra mussel and Asian
carp have caused significant interference with rights held in common by the
public such as fishing, bathing, and boating. The Congressional response to
preventing the spread of invasive species has been ad hoc and largely unsuccessful. In short, the regulatory landscape currently in place to address
aquatic invasive species is more akin to the water pollution statutes discussed in Milwaukee I than to the comprehensive regulatory statutes at
issue in Milwaukee II and AEP.
In Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the State of Michigan
brought a lawsuit to prevent the spread of Asian carp into the Great Lakes
under the federal common law of public nuisance.12 7 The case provides an
instructive example of how an argument that such a claim is displaced by
federal law might unfold.
A.

Background

Chicago's decision to reverse the flow of the Chicago River and its
subsequent development of the Chicago Area Waterway System
("CAWS") had the effect of connecting two major waterways that were
previously unconnected: the Mississippi River system and the Great

or authorized administrative standards, only a federal common law basis can provide an adequate means
for dealing with such claims as alleged federal rights.")).
126. Id. at 103-104.
127. Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, No. 10-cv-4457, 2010 WL 5018559 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 2,
2010).
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Lakes.1 28 While this connection has allowed for the free flow of commercial goods via shipping, it also represents a pathway for aquatic invasive
species introduced into the Great Lakes watershed to extend their reach
throughout the extensive Mississippi watershed, and vice versa. 129 In response to concerns about the spread of aquatic invasive species between the
two watersheds, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps") has constructed and is operating an electric dispersal barrier in the Chicago Sanitary and Ship Canal ("CSSC"). 130 Unfortunately, DNA testing has
indicated the presence of Asian carp between the electric barrier and Lake
Michigan,131 and at least one live Asian carp has been found above the
barrier.1 32
In 2010, the State of Michigan and other states bordering the Great
Lakes twice petitioned the Supreme Court to issue a preliminary injunction
against the State of Illinois and the Corps to increase their efforts to prevent
the spread of Asian carp.1 33 These petitions were both failures. 134 Michiganl 35 has since brought an action against the Corps and the Metropolitan
Water Reclamation District of Greater Chicago ("MWRD") in the District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois. 136 Most controversially, in its
motion for preliminary injunction, Michigan requested the temporary closure of locks connecting Lake Michigan and the CAWS, except as needed
128. See id. at *2.
129.

JOEL BRAMMEIER, IRWIN POLLS, & SCUDDER MACKEY, PRELIMINARY FEASIBILITY OF

ECOLOGICAL SEPARATION OF THE MISSISSIPPI RIVER AND THE GREAT LAKES TO PREVENT THE
at
available
ii
(2008),
INVASIVE
SPECIES
OF
AQUATIC
TRANSFER
http://www.glfc.org/carp/waterwayseparation.pdf ("The Chicago Waterway System (CWS) has already
allowed several damaging [aquatic invasive species] to move between the Great Lakes and the Mississippi River Basin, including the zebra mussel and round goby.").
130. See ASIAN CARP WORKING GROUP, AQUATIC NUISANCE SPECIES TASK FORCE,
MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL PLAN FOR BIGHEAD, BLACK, GRASS, AND SILVER CARPS INTHE UNITED
STATES 70-71 (Conover, G., R. Simmonds, and M. Whalen, eds. 2007), available at
http://www.asiancarp.org/documents/CarpsManagementPlan.pdf.
131. Michigan, 2010 WL 5018559 at *7 & n.10 ("There have been sixty positive eDNA samples
taken from above the barrier.").
132. Id. at *7 ("[O]n June 22, 2010, a single, live bighead carp was recovered from Lake Calumet,
north of the O'Brien Lock and Dam, six miles from Lake Michigan (and above the barrier).").
133. Order Denying Motion of Michigan for Preliminary Injunction at 3 (Jan. 19, 2010), available
at http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/011910zor.pdf; Order Denying Renewed Motion of
Michigan
for
Preliminary
Injunction
at
2
(Mar.
22,
2010),
available at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/032210zor.pdf.
134. Order Denying Motion of Michigan for Preliminary Injunction at 3 (Jan. 19, 2010), available
at http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/011910zor.pdf; Order Denying Renewed Motion of
2
(Mar.
22,
2010),
available at
for
Preliminary
Injunction
at
Michigan
http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/0322I0zor.pdf.
135. Along with Michigan, the states of Minnesota, Ohio, and Wisconsin, and the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania are named as plaintiffs in the suit. Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief,
Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs (No. 1:10-cv-04457) (N.D. Ill. Jul. 19, 2010).
136. Id.
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to protect public health and safety,137 which would likely have the effect of
preventing commercial and recreational navigation between the two waterways. The suit was brought, in part, under the federal common law of
public nuisance. 138
B.

The Parties'Arguments

Michigan argued that the waters of the Great Lakes are held in trust by
the states bordering the lakes for the benefit of the public, and that the public's rights in those waters include, inter alia, fishing, boating, commerce,
and recreation. 139 Because the evidence, according to Michigan, suggests
that if Asian carp were to enter the Great Lakes they would cause substantial harm to those public rights, the Corps and MWRD's operation of the
CAWS in a way that is likely to allow Asian carp to invade the Great Lakes
constitutes a continuing public nuisance. 140
The Corps argued that Michigan's public nuisance claim is displaced
by federal law.141 In the Corps' view, its operation of the CAWS is congressionally authorized by several statutes that instruct it to facilitate navigation on the waterway. Specifically, the Corps points to provisions of
congressional appropriations legislation that have provided funding to the
Corps to "operate and maintain" the CAWS "in the interest of navigation." 1 42 The Corps also points to provisions of NANPCA that it says allow
the Corps to "incorporate" measures to prevent aquatic invasive species
into its "ongoing operations" in operating the CSSC.143 Thus, according to
the Corps, "Congress has spoken," and common law public nuisance
claims like Michigan's are displaced.
MWRD, an entity chartered by the State of Illinois, which is responsible for operating navigation locks separating Lake Michigan from the
CAWS, points to the Restatement (Second) of Torts for the proposition that
conduct that would be a public nuisance at common law, but which is fully
authorized by law, will not subject an actor for tort liability. 144 MWRD
137. Id. at 31-32.
138. Id. at 1l.
139. Id. at 85.
140. Id. at 87, 89-91.
141. Federal Defendant's Motion in Opposition to Plaintiffs Preliminary Injunction Motion,
Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs (No. 1:10-cv-04457) at 23-25. Although defendants have other
arguments about why Michigan's nuisance claim should fail, those arguments are outside the scope of
this article.
142. Id. at 24-25 (citing 95 Stat. 1135, 97 Stat. 301, and 60 Stat. 634).
143. Id. at 25 (citing 16 U.S.C. §§ 4722(i)(3)(A), (B)(ii)).
144. Metro. Water Reclamation Dist. of Greater Chicago's Response in Opposition to Plaintiff's
Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Plaintiffs Brief in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction
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argues that it is "charged [by statute] with the duty of collecting, transporting, and treating sanitary and waste water, and maintaining the area waterways-all in the name of protecting the local public health," and that it
otherwise complies with applicable laws.1 45 Therefore, its operations cannot be considered a public nuisance. MWRD also relies extensively on TVA
to argue that Michigan's public nuisance claim should be held displaced.146
According to MWRD:
In TVA, North Carolina was dissatisfied with the air quality standard authorized by Congress, established by the [EPA], and implemented
through state permits, and it requested that the federal courts impose a
different set of standards. [TVA at * 15]. Similarly, in the instant case, the
Plaintiffs are dissatisfied with the federally authorized measures being
made by the Corps and other federal agencies, as well as the measures
being implemented by the State of Illinois, other local agencies, and the
[MWRD], in addressing the [Asian carp]. 147
C.

The Court's Ruling

On December 2, 2010, Judge Robert M. Dow, Jr. issued an opinion in
the case. 148 Although the court agreed with Michigan that its common law
nuisance claim was not displaced by federal law, it denied Michigan's motion for a preliminary injunction, writing that Michigan had demonstrated
only a modest likelihood of success on their public nuisance claim and that
the evidence did not support the existence of an "unreasonable nuisance as
a result of Defendants' actions or inactions in maintaining and operating
the CAWS."l 4 9 The court also included a discussion of the TVA case, suggesting that, as in TVA, Defendants' activities are authorized by the government.150 As a result, the court was reluctant to enjoin such governmentauthorized activity for constituting a public nuisance. 15 1
The court relied on Milwaukee I and Milwaukee II to evaluate whether
federal law displaced Michigan's common law nuisance claim.1 52 The
Court wrote:

(No. 1:10-cv-04457) (N.D. Ill. Aug. 4, 2010) at 25 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821B Cmt.
f.).
145. Id. at 25.
146. Id at 25-29.
147. Id. at 26-27.
148. Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, No. 10-cv-4457, 2010 WL 5018559 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 2,
2010).
149. Id at *2 1.
150. Id. at *22-24.
151. Id.
152. See id at *18-20.
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Apparent comprehensiveness of Congressional legislation is only one indication of displacement. While there appeared to be comprehensive legislation on the subject of water pollution in Milwaukee I, for there to be
displacement, the comprehensive legislation also must address the problem at issue and do so specifically to displace the common law. 153
In the court's judgment, the federal statutes identified by the Corps
and MWRD "do not comprehensively and specifically address the threat of
an Asian carp invasion of Lake Michigan through the CAWS ... nor do
they provide a specific mandate or methods for adequately addressing the
threat." 54 While the court acknowledged that NANPCA speaks to the
threat of aquatic nuisance species in the CAWS, it dismissed the NANPCA
provisions as not representing a comprehensive approach to preventing the
spread of Asian carp.15 5 Further, the court did not agree that the statutes
identified by Defendants cover Michigan's claims or provide an adequate
remedy to Michigan.156 Thus, the court rejected Defendants' displacement
claims, writing that "[a]t present, this is a Milwaukee I case, not a Milwaukee II case." 157
Although the court sided with Michigan on the preemption issue, Defendants persuaded the court that, as in TVA and New EnglandLegal Foundation v. Costlel58, their government-authorized activity should not be held
to constitute a public nuisance. 159 The court wrote that, even if the evidence
pointed more convincingly to an existing or imminent threat of injury,
Michigan would have to deal with the problem that courts are typically
reluctant to enjoin government-authorized activity as a public nuisance. 160
The court analogized the instant case to TVA, noting that in both cases "the
153. Id. at *19.
154. Id. at *20.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. 666 F.2d 30, 33 (2d Cir. 1981).
159. Indeed, the court acknowledged its application of the rule was the functional equivalent of
finding displacement by clarifying in a footnote that
[njone of this discussion of the TVA and Costle cases is meant to suggest that the federal
common law tort of public nuisance is preempted by any of the existing laws that pertain to
the management and operation of the CAWS or the authority of the Corps to deal with the
Asian carp problem. Nor should this discussion be viewed as suggesting that a public nuisance claim against a federal agency can never succeed. Nevertheless, the concerns identified
by the Fourth Circuit in TVA and the Second Circuit in Costle are significant, and any plaintiff
seeking mandatory injunctive relief against a federal agency in circumstances like those present in those cases (and this one) must come to grips with those concerns.
Michigan, 2010 WL 5018559 at *24 n.22.
160. Id. at *22 (quoting New EnglandLegal Found v. Costle, 666 F.2d 30, 33 (2d Cir. 1981); see
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 821 B cmt. F ("Although it would be a nuisance at common
law, conduct that is fully authorized by statute, ordinance or administrative regulation does not subject
the actor to tort liability.").
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parties to the litigation agree on the end-in that case, 'the desirability of
reducing air pollution'; here, preventing the establishment of a selfsustaining population of Asian carp in Lake Michigan-but dispute the
'most effective means' to that end."1 61 The court acknowledged that the
statute and regulations at issue in TVA were far more comprehensive and
specific to the air pollution issues in that case than those at issue in the
instant case. 162 However, the court found the Fourth Circuit's opinion in
TVA instructive because both cases involved public nuisance claims in
response to "complex environmental problem[s] as to which Congress and
federal agencies have spoken in some fashion." 63
The court was convinced that Congress and federal agencies had spoken on the issue of the Defendants' operation of the CAWS in the face of
Asian carp advancing toward the Great Lakes. 164 According to the court,
Congress had instructed the Corps to operate the CAWS in the interest of
navigation, to incorporate measures to prevent the spread of ANS into ongoing operations of the CAWS, and to take any additional emergency
measures it deemed necessary to prevent Asian carp from entering the
Great Lakes.165 In addition, the court noted that, "it is readily apparent
from the executive and legislative activity in the few months since this
lawsuit was commenced that the White House and Congress have focused
their attention on the Asian carp issue and that further federal ... initiatives
are under consideration."1 66
Underlying the court's discussion, and of major concern to the Fourth
Circuit in TVA, are policy considerations about the appropriate role for
courts and administrative agencies in the realm of complex environmental
issues. 167 The court agreed with the Fourth Circuit that federal courts
should refrain from applying the "omnibus" tort of public nuisance, especially in the context of complex environmental problems, where Congress
or delegated agencies have already given their considered judgment to the
issue. In this vein, the court wrote:
[I]t would be equally difficult to conceive of the "all purpose" public
nuisance tort as an appropriate vehicle for the imposition of mandatory
161. Michigan, 2010 WL 5018559 at *22 (internal citations omitted).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at *23-24.
165. Id.at *23.
166. Id.
167. Id. ("[T]he Fourth Circuit's teaching that 'courts in this highly technical arena respect [sic]
[should] respect the strengths of the agency processes on which Congress has placed its imprimatur'
remains relevant." (citing North Carolina v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 615 F.3d 291, 305-306 (4th
Cir. 2010))).
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injunctive relief that would substitute the Court's views of an appropriate
plan of action for Defendants' judgment on the basis of the balancing of
competing interests and concerns at issue in the management and operation of the CAWS. Any court-ordered relief along the lines requested by
Plaintiffs very likely would affect lock operations, lake-water diversion,
water quality, navigation, flood control, and of course isolating, capturing or killing Asian carp. All of these matters already are addressed, at
least in some fashion, by existing statutes, regulations, rules, ordinances,
and/or management policies, and remain subject to additional measures
that may be imposed by Congress and/or the Asian Carp Director. 168
Thus, the court's reluctance to enjoin the Defendant's congressionally
authorized activities as public nuisance activities, coupled with Michigan's
failure to persuade the court of an existing or imminent threat of harm, led
the court to deny Michigan's motion for a preliminary injunction.
D. Analysis of the Court's Opinion
1.

Displacement

The court clearly answered the displacement question correctly. The
discrete legislative provisions relied upon by the Corps are a far cry from
the "all encompassing program . .. of regulation" at issue in Milwaukee II.
The first two statutes relied upon by the Corps are provisions of annual
appropriations legislation that provided funding to the Corps to operate
facilities in the CSSC "as . .. necessary to sustain through navigation from
Chicago Harbor on Lake Michigan to Lockport on the Des Plaines River."
The provisions of NANPCA relied upon by the Corps do not mandate that
any efforts to prevent aquatic invasive species introductions between the
two watersheds must not interfere with navigation. Rather, Congress instructed the Corps to
investigate and identify environmentally sound methods for preventing
and reducing the dispersal of aquatic nuisance species between the Great
Lakes-Saint Lawrence drainage and the Mississippi River drainage
through the Chicago River Ship and Sanitary Canal, including any of
those methods that could be incorporated into the operation or construction of the lock system of the Chicago River Ship and Sanitary Canal. 169
One could read the word "including" in the above phrase to indicate
that Congress did not necessarily want the Corps to exclude methods that
might not be capable of incorporation into the lock system of the CSSC.
Further, one could interpret the above phrase to mean Congress wanted the
Corps to consider use of the locks themselves (i.e., closing them) as a
means of preventing and reducing the dispersal of aquatic invasive species
168. Id. at *24 (footnote omitted).

169. 16 U.S.C. § 4722(i)(3)(A).
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between the two waterways. Although not mentioned by the Corps, Congress has also authorized the Corps to conduct "a feasibility study of the
range of options and technologies available to prevent the spread of aquatic
nuisance species between the Great Lakes and Mississippi River Basins
through the Chicago Sanitary and Ship Canal."l 70
Finally, the Corps' argument that Congress has displaced any federal
common law nuisance claims to the extent it has instructed the Corps to
operate the CAWS to sustain navigation is diminished by other Acts of
Congress that authorize the Corps to make changes to its operations in the
name of improving the environment. 171 Specifically, Congress has authorized the Corps
to review water resources projects constructed by the Secretary to determine the need for modifications in the structures and operations of such
projects for the purpose of improving the quality of the environment in
the public interest and to determine if the operation of such projects has
contributed to the degradation of the quality of the environment. 172
Thus, it is simply not clear from the statutes advanced by the Corps
that Congress has "announce[d] [its] considered judgment" 73 on the issue
in this case: whether the Corps' actions, by arguably failing to prevent the
introduction of Asian carp into the Great Lakes, can give rise to a common
law cause of action.
2.

The Restatement Rule

The court may have overplayed its hand in its conclusion that Michigan failed to overcome the restatement rule that "conduct that is fully authorized by statute, ordinance or administrative regulation does not subject
the actor to tort liability."' 74 The court's application of the reasoning employed in TVA and Costle is weakened by the significant underlying factual
and regulatory differences in Michigan. As the court acknowledged, the
regulatory setting in TVA was a world apart from that involved in the instant case. 175 The discrete provisions of statutes identified by the Corps and
MWRD are simply incomparable to the comprehensive system of air pollu-

170. Water Resources Development Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-114 § 3061(d), 121 Stat. 1041,
1121 (2007).
171. See 33 U.S.C.A. § 2309a(a).
172. Id.
173. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 315 (1981) (quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 625 (1978)).
174. Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, No. 10-cv-4457, 2010 WL 5018559, *23 (N.D. Ill.
Dec. 2, 2010) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §821B cmt. F).
175. See id. at *22 ("To be sure, the rules and regulations at issue in TVA were more comprehensive (and specific) than those at issue here .... ).
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tion regulations embodied by the Clean Air Act at issue in TVA. Unlike the
Corps and MWRD, the TVA's air emissions had been specifically approved through a permitting process pursuant to a comprehensive federal
statute.
The following hypothetical demonstrates what would be a more apt
comparison between the two sets of defendants. Assume for the moment
that TVA occurred in a pre-Clean Air Act world. Faced with a public nuisance claim against it, TVA would likely be unable to successfully argue
that its congressionally authorized duty to provide low cost electricity to
the citizens of the Southern U.S. means it should not be subject to public
nuisance liability for interstate air pollution. On these facts, a court could
not reasonably apply the restatement rule that it should refrain from enjoining TVA's air pollution as a public nuisance because TVA had an unrelated
duty to provide electricity. Likewise, the Michigan Defendants' failure to
prevent the spread of Asian carp should not be considered beyond the reach
of an injunction merely because unrelated and less-than-comprehensive
statutes authorize them to operate the CAWS. Thus, the court should have
more forcefully rejected any comparison between the Michigan defendants
and TVA because federal common law applies "[u]ntil the field has been
made the subject of comprehensive legislation or authorized administrative
standards."l 76
In addition to TVA, the court points to Costle as exemplifying application of the restatement rule.177 In Costle, plaintiffs alleged that a power
company's practice of burning high sulfur fuel oil to create electricity was
creating a nuisance. 178 As in TVA, the court pointed out that defendant's
practice was specifically approved by the EPA pursuant to its authority
under the Clean Air Act.179 However, there the EPA affirmatively decided
to authorize the power company's practice by approving a variance to New
York's state implementation plan under the Clean Air Act. Those actions
are of a wholly different character from what passes for "fully authorized"
in the instant case.
First, except for a provision in the Corps' fiscal year 2009 appropriation (the "Section 126 authority"),'so the statutes that the court points to for
176. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 107 n.9 (1972) (quoting Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d
236, 241-242 (10th Cir. 1971)).
177. Michigan, 2010 WL 5018559 at *22 (quoting New England Legal Found. v. Costle, 666 F.2d
30, 33 (2d Cir. 1981)).
178. Costle, 666 F.2d at 31.
179. Id. at 31-32.
180. The court refers to this as the "Section 126 authority" because it stems from Pub. L. No. I1185 § 126. 123 Stat. 2845, 2853 (2009). Michigan, 2010 WL 5018559 at *5.
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the proposition that the Defendants' conduct is fully authorized all pre-date
the threat of Asian carp reaching the Great Lakes. 18 1 The court seems to be
on shaky ground to the extent it relies on statutes passed before the current
threat as evidence that Defendants' conduct has been fully authorized. Second, although the Section 126 authority was passed specifically in response to the Asian carp threat, that provision is only temporary,1 82 and is
written at such a level of generality,183 as to call into question whether,
standing alone, it can justify application of the restatement rule. Third, this
reliance is further undermined by the fact that Congress has also instructed
the Corps to review its projects to determine the need for modifications
necessary to protect the environment. 184
Ultimately, the court's conclusion on this point seems to reflect an understandable reluctance to wade into the murky waters of technically complex environmental issues that are being considered through '[an] agency
process on which Congress has placed its imprimatur."'" 85 However, the
court's efforts to compare the instant case to TVA and Costle are strained.
Judicial restraint certainly makes sense in the context of the extensive regulatory structure established by Congress in the Clean Air Act, at issue in
those cases. Such restraint is much less justified in the context of the scant
legal framework established by Congress to prevent the spread of Asian
carp into the Great Lakes through the CAWS. There is no dispute that administrative agencies today do much of the work that common law courts
used to, especially in the realm of environmental law. But where Congress
and administrative agencies have yet to squarely address an issue like that
involved in Michigan, courts should heed the command of Milwaukee I that
federal common law applies.1 86 That would seem to be the case here.
Shortly before this note went to press, the Seventh Circuit issued an
opinion upholding the district court's refusal to grant preliminary injunctive

181. Id. at *23. (citing Act of Dec. 4, 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-88, § 107, 95 Stat. 1135 (CSSC to be
operated "in the interest of navigation"); Act of July 30, 1983, Tit. I, Ch. IV, 97 Stat. 301 (Chicago
Lock); River and Harbors Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-525, 60 Stat. 634 (July 24, 1946) (same, for
O'Brien lock). (emphasis added to dates)).
182. The Section 126 authority is limited to "the 1-year period beginning on the date of enactment
of [Pub. L. No 111-85] . . . " Pub. L. No. 111-85 § 126. 123 Stat. 2845, 2853 (2009).
183. The Section 126 authority authorizes the Secretary of the Army to undertake, "such modifications or emergency measures as [he] determines to be appropriate, to prevent aquatic nuisance species
from bypassing the [electric barrier] and . .. to prevent aquatic nuisance species from dispersing into
the Great Lakes." Id.
184. 33 U.S.C.A. § 2309a(a).
185. Michigan, 2010 WL 5018559 at *23 (quoting North Carolina v. Tennessee Valley Authority,
615 F.3d 291, 305-306 (4th Cir. 2010)).
186. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 107 n.9 (1972) (quoting Texas v. Pankey, 441
F.2d 236, 241-242 (10th Cir. 1971)).
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relief.187 While a full analysis of the Seventh Circuit's opinion is beyond
the scope of this note, the opinion was well reasoned and warrants a few
remarks. In a unanimous opinion for a three judge panel, Judge Diane
Wood agreed with the lower court that the common law public nuisance
claim was not displaced by federal law, writing that "[fjor better or for
worse, congressional efforts to curb the migration of invasive species, and
of invasive carp in particular, have yet to reach the level of detail one sees
in the air or water pollution schemes." 88 However, Judge Wood suggested
that the extent of federal agency action to prevent the Carp from entering
the Great Lakes "might add up to displace as a matter of fact any role that
equity might otherwise play." 89 The court was persuaded that the balance
of harms favored the defendants because several of the plaintiffs proposed
remedies were problematic and the court questioned how much additional
protection would be afforded beyond the agency actions that are already
being undertaken.1 90 Notably, however, Judge Wood wrote that its conclusions were based on the "current state of play" and that the district court
"would have the authority to revisit the question whether an exercise of its
equitable powers is warranted" if the agencies became complacent or other
new evidence came to light.191
E.

Summary

The experience in the U.S. with zebra mussels and Asian carp demonstrate that impacts from aquatic invasive species often unreasonably interfere with rights commonly held by the public such as boating, bathing, and
fishing. As such, the common law of public nuisance should be available to
remedy these impacts. Further, such public nuisance claims should generally not be held to be preempted by federal law because Congress has not yet
passed comprehensive legislation to address the impacts from aquatic invasive species.
Michigan provides a recent demonstration of such a case. There,
Plaintiffs sought an injunction, alleging that Defendants' failure to take
more aggressive actions to prevent the spread of Asian carp into the Great
Lakes constituted a public nuisance. While the court agreed with Plaintiffs
that their common law public nuisance claim was not displaced by the statutes at issue in the case, it held that Plaintiffs had failed to prove an exist187. Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 17714 (Aug. 24, 2011).
188. Id. at *35.
189. Id. at *91.
190. Id. at *66-*99.
191. Id at *99.
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ing or imminent threat of harm. Further, the court relied on the restatement
rule that courts are reluctant to enjoin conduct that is authorized by law as a
public nuisance. However, the court's reliance on the rule of restraint may
have been misplaced. The court's conclusion that the defendants' conduct
was "fully authorized" by statute was less convincing than the Clean Air
Act-permitted conduct at issue in the cases cited by the court.
CONCLUSION
Aquatic invasive species like the Asian carp have caused grave ecological and economic harm across the United States. Yet, despite the extent
of the existing and anticipated damage, Congress and the federal agencies'
efforts to get a handle on the problem through legislation and delegated
regulatory authority can only be described as piecemeal and ineffective.
Historically, the common law of public nuisance served as an important
tool for providing a remedy to plaintiffs who have suffered an injury due to
transboundary pollution. More recently, courts have established that such
common law public nuisance claims will be displaced where Congress has
comprehensively regulated in a field. Indeed, as Michigan shows, some
courts have recently applied rules of judicial restraint to reject such common law claims even in the absence of comprehensive regulation.
While the common law of public nuisance may not be the most effective means of addressing many complex environmental issues,1 92 it nonetheless should remain available where Congress has failed to establish a
better system, as in the case of addressing impacts from aquatic invasive
species. Until Congress acts more thoroughly to address these impacts,
fairness and Supreme Court precedent command that the doors of the judicial system remain open to such claims.

192. Judges have understandably questioned, for example, "whether expert witnesses in bench
trials can replicate the sources that EPA can bring to bear." North Carolina v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 615 F.3d 291, 304 (4th Cir. 2010).

